No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/09/06 : LOC-HAK-558-21-12-6



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

20 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Daily Report on Cambodia

We have nothing significant to report.

Richard Helms Director

DIA, ARMY, NSA reviews completed.



Report #21 22 May 1970

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS

In a follow-up to DIA's report of yesterday concerning the personnel bottleneck in the Laotian Panhandle, communications intercepts from Binh Tram 34 (west of the A Shau Valley) indicate administrative confusion in the rear services of the NVA and VC. BinhTram 34, apparently unable to determine what do do with their overload of personnel replacements in the pipeline, requested instructions as to which southward moving groups were to be stopped and which permitted to continue. 559th Transportation Group's response indicated that with the exception of a single group, all personnel destined for "Nam Bo" (III and IV Corps) were to be halted in place.

Despite having withdrawn to positions well inside Cambodia, DIA has noted that major elements of COSVN's headquarters continue to experience significant communications problems as a result of Allied cross-border operations. During the past several days, one or more COSVN political links have frequently been shut down to avoid detection. As an example, during the night of 21 May the terminal serving COSVN political headquarters itself instructed all stations to stand by, and then went off the air for a period of six hours. Normally, the hours of darkness are considered prime time for enemy communications. The ARC LIGHT strike in this area during the same time frame was probably responsible for the termination of communications.

Darken Kir.


In other examples, COSVN's major military headquarters has been forced to institute a lower level of communications activity while its higher-echelon military and logistical subordinates are maintaining only minimal communications with their subordinates. Communications emphasis and priorities have been shifted to subordinate tactical stations, suggesting the elements of COSVN are exerting less control over their tactical subordinates.

A document captured 9 May in the Parrot's Beak revealed that Communist forces have experienced many difficulties in obtaining food as a result of the present situation in Cambodia. The document stated that, starting in May, all subordinates of Subregion 2 (SR-2) would have to provide their own logistical support, including food and money. The document also stated that SR-2 Hq found it necessary to disperse out of the Ba Thu area in late April. Their attempt at dispersal apparently failed as six of SR-2's eight battalions were identified during the recent fighting near Ba Thu.

DIA notes that Communist unit headquarters continue to be detected in major moves as they attempt to avoid Allied operations. On 21 May, a sapper battalion subordinate to the B-3 Front was fixed by COMINT 22 miles west of the Plei Djereng CIDG Camp, a move of some 47 miles from the unit's 4 May location in Base Area 702.

To the south, the 88th NVA Regiment was detected in a new location as they continue their efforts to escape contact with Allied forces. Fixed with regularity in the vicinity of Base Area 709 prior to the operations in Cambodia, the 88th Regiment has been relocating on an almost daily basis.

Concerning the status of LOC's leading to Phnom Penh, road routes #1, #2, #4, #5, and #6 are open, but with escort required on #1, #2, and #4. The destruction of a bridge along route #6 prevents through traffic. The railroad line between Phnom Penh and Kompong Som remains cut, while the Thai Border-Phnom Penh line is open. Concerning waterways, the Mekong is closed north of Kompong Cham but is open to the south of that town with armed escort required.



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